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IN RE WEINSTEIN COMPANY HOLDINGS LLC: AN OVERLY
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
LIMITS MUCH-NEEDED FLEXIBILITY
THOMAS HAUK* & ANDREW SCHWARTZ**
I. INTRODUCTION
Executory contracts are one of the most complicated and consequential areas of bankruptcy law.1 Despite the importance of executory contracts, the Bankruptcy Code provides no definition for what an executory
contract is.2 Most courts have adopted the Countryman definition of executory contracts, but alternative analyses exist that focus primarily on the
ultimate outcome without the strict form requirements that are present in
an analysis of a contract under the definition.3
In May 2021, the Third Circuit examined a highly consequential contract in In re Weinstein Company Holdings LLC.4 In this case, The Weinstein
Company (TWC) sold a work-made-for-hire contract that was entered into
with Bruce Cohen, a movie producer.5 When TWC filed its voluntary petition for bankruptcy, it owed Cohen $400,000 under the contract.6
This Casebrief argues that the Third Circuit should have adopted the
analytical framework of Jay Westbrook and Kelsi Stayart White when it determined whether the Cohen agreement was, in fact, executory. Part II of
this Casebrief briefly discusses important social issues surrounding this
case. Part III analyzes key sections of the Bankruptcy Code and state law
* J.D. / M.B.A. Candidate, 2023, Villanova University Charles Widger School
of Law; B.S., 2020, Saint Joseph’s University. I would like to thank my friends and
family for their constant support throughout law school, as well as the Villanova
Law Review team for their hard work and feedback. I would also like to give a
special thank you to my co-author Andrew Schwartz, who was phenomenal to work
with throughout the writing process.
** J.D. Candidate, 2023, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S. Economics, 2017, Penn State University. I could not have done this without
the love and support of my friends and family. I would also like to thank my coauthor Thomas Hauk for all his hard work preparing this Casebrief. Thank you all
very much.
1. See Bob Eisenbach, Executory Contracts–—What Are They And Why Do They
Matter In Bankruptcy?, COOLEY LLP: IN THE (RED) BLOG, (July 18, 2006), https://
bankruptcy.cooley.com/2006/07/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/executorycontracts-what-are-they-and-why-do-they-matter-in-bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc
/6CRJ-6CMM].
2. See infra notes 28–45 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 28–45 and accompanying text (introducing the Countryman
definition and discussing its origin, history, and modern use).
4. 997 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2021).
5. See id. at 501.
6. See id. at 502.

(801)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [], Art. 5

802

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67: p. 801

that are pertinent to this case. Part IV discusses the facts underlying this
case. Part V follows by discussing the Third Circuit’s reasoning behind the
holding. Part VI analyzes the Cohen agreement under the approach espoused by Westbrook and White and further discusses issues with the
Countryman definition of executory contracts. Finally, Part VII looks at
the impact that this framework of analysis would have on this case and
others like it.
II. OVERVIEW
A.

ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
#METOO MOVEMENT

OF THE

AND THE

The Influence of the Entertainment Industry

One commentator describes the relationship between bankruptcies
and the entertainment industry as an “endless matrix of complex, unexplored issues.”7 In addition to wider industry and economic trends, the
risk of bankruptcy is right around the corner for even some of the most
successful movie studios if an expensive production flops at the box office.8 In addition to complex bankruptcy considerations, the entertainment industry, more generally, wields a great amount of power over
society.9 Due to the significant influence the entertainment industry
holds, it is reasonable to assume that developments in bankruptcy law in
this area receive outsize attention, both in the legal and non-legal worlds.
B.

The #MeToo Movement

The authors would be remiss if we did not mention the context in
which this case came to the bankruptcy court. In October 2017, the New
York Times published an article that revealed claims of sexual misconduct
against Harvey Weinstein that spanned nearly thirty years.10 What fol7. See Schuyler M. Moore, Entertainment Bankruptcies: The Copyright Act Meets the
Bankruptcy Code, BUS. LAW., Feb. 1993, at 567, 567 (1992). Entertainment bankruptcies are particularly difficult because they often involve copyright, contract,
international, and bankruptcy law. Id.
8. See Jon O’Brien, 15 Movies That Bankrupted Their Studios, MENTAL FLOSS
(Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/643698/movies-that-bankrupted-studios [https://perma.cc/UW42-KHTD] (providing examples of films
that were expensive to produce, did not realize commercial success, and ultimately
contributed to the bankruptcy of the producing studio).
9. See Jonathan Kaufman, Mindset Matters: The Influence of Entertainment and the
Significance of Culture Change in the Business Of a New Decade, FORBES (Dec. 24, 2019,
1:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathankaufman/2019/12/24/mindset-matters-the-influence-of-entertainment-and-the-significance-of-culture-changein-the-business-of-a-new-decade/?sh=68e697035a7e [https://perma.cc/G5BXLDF4] (“There has been no greater disseminator of culture in the history of humankind than that of the entertainment industry.”).
10. Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment
Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/
05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/PFC9ENU2]. Mr. Weinstein’s behavior was well-known in his company and Hollywood,
but few people spoke about it. Id. A 2015 memo was written by a TWC employee
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lowed can only be introduced as a fundamental shift in how the entertainment industry and society understood the complex dynamics between
producers and actors, bosses and employees, and those in positions of
power over subordinates.11 Although the rest of this Casebrief does not
address the criminal aspects that led to TWC’s collapse and bankruptcy, it
is imperative that all who read this are reminded of this context.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Bankruptcy Is a Complex System Designed to Balance the Interests of Debtors
and Creditors

To better understand the legal environment in which this case was
decided, it is necessary to review the pertinent sections of the Bankruptcy
Code. First, the delineation between state law and federal bankruptcy law,
as described in Butner v. United States,12 is described. Then, § 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code is discussed to better understand why the contract at
issue in this case could be sold in the manner that it was. Next, executory
and brought to the attention of the company’s board, but the board did not conduct an investigation. Id. The New York Times article revealed that “Mr. Weinstein
has reached at least eight settlements with women,” including the woman who
wrote the 2015 memo. Id. The #MeToo movement resulted in a groundswell of
credible claims of sexual misconduct against powerful men across the world. See,
e.g., Audrey Carlsen, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K.
Patel & Zach Wichter, #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their
Replacements Are Women, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/
10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/4A8J-EP55] (last updated
Oct. 29, 2018). Mr. Weinstein was the focus of at least 100 of these claims. Harvey
Weinstein Sexual Abuse Cases, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_Weinstein_sexual_abuse_cases [https://perma.cc/N5Q4-3A2V] (last visited
Oct. 21, 2022). Mr. Weinstein is currently serving a twenty-three-year sentence in
New York State prison after being convicted on one count each of first-degree
criminal sexual act and third-degree rape. See Jan Ransom, Harvey Weinstein’s Stunning Downfall: 23 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-sentencing.html
[https://perma.cc/C8LG-MT8T] (explaining that although Mr. Weinstein faced a
minimum of five years in prison, the judge decided to sentence him to a much
longer sentence because of the seriousness of the situation). The judge further
explained that “there is evidence before me of other incidents of sexual assault
involving a number of women, all of which are legitimate considerations for sentence,” and “[a]lthough this is a first conviction, it is not a first offense.” Id. Finally, in July 2021, New York extradited Mr. Weinstein to California to face
additional charges of sexual misconduct originating in that state. See, e.g., Jonah E.
Bromwich, Harvey Weinstein Is Transferred to California to Face Sex Crime Charges, N.Y.
TIMES (July 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/nyregion/harveyweinstein-california-transfer.html [https://perma.cc/E5WM-LCGB].
11. See Maya Salam, One Year After #MeToo, Examining a Collective Awakening,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/us/me-toomovement-women.html [https://perma.cc/5JLX-QLT8] (explaining how the revelations about Harvey Weinstein “hit like a meteor” and kicked off advocacy group
and government investigations).
12. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
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contracts and their various definitions are discussed in depth. These topics help lay a foundation for a better understanding of this case.
1.

The Butner Principle

Unless a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code requires a different treatment, substantive rights of the debtor and creditors are created by
state law.13 The Bankruptcy Code establishes procedure for all cases
heard in federal Bankruptcy Courts, but those procedures have to follow
the substantive law of the state as if the dispute was being heard in a state
court.14 To summarize, “there is no reason why such interests should be
analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding.”15 This straightforward idea is seminal to bankruptcy and, thus, “has been cited thousands upon thousands of times.”16
One of the main reasons for employing this distinction is the concern
the Supreme Court had over forum-shopping.17 If the Court decided
Butner the opposite way, a company that did not like its chances in state
court could simply declare bankruptcy because it would receive the opposite ruling under the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction.18 Even before
Butner, the framers of the older Bankruptcy Act and academics were aware
of this problem and viewed the Butner principle to be the solution.19
2.

Sale of Substantially All Assets

Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to sell property of the estate, including substantially all of its assets.20 Importantly, a
related provision allows the property to be sold “free and clear of any interest,” assuming certain conditions are met.21 A party that holds an inter13. See id. at 55. This case came to the Supreme Court due to a circuit split
between the Third and Seventh Circuits on one side and the Second, Fourth,
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits on the other side. Id. at 51–52. The issue concerned whether state or federal law governed security interests in rents collected
during the bankruptcy proceedings. Id. The former group developed a “federal
rule of equity that affords the mortgagee a secured interest in the rents even if
state law would not recognize any such interest until after foreclosure.” Id. at 53.
The latter group followed the law of whatever state law governed the creation of
security interests. Id. at 52.
14. See id. at 54–55; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
15. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
16. Rich Mullen, Bankruptcy 101—Back to Basics with Butner, WEIL, GOTSHAL &
MANGES LLP: WEIL RESTRUCTURING (Oct. 27, 2011), https://restructuring.weil.com/throwback-thursday/bankruptcy-101-back-to-basics-with-butner/
[https://perma.cc/7KWK-ZF4Q].
17. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55; see also G. Marcus Cole & Todd J. Zywicki, Anna
Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: The New Forum-Shopping Problem in Bankruptcy, 2010 UTAH
L. REV. 511, 516 (2010).
18. See Cole & Zywicki, supra note 17, at 516.
19. Id. at 521.
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). This provision specifically applies to the sale of
assets “other than in the ordinary course of business.” Id.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f). Section 363(f) states in full:
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est in property to be sold is not without recourse; the court is obligated to
block any such sale that does not provide that party with “adequate protection” for its interest.22
Judges developed a complex area of law around this provision to account for contours not directly contemplated by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code.23 This development allows parties to get more out of the
bankruptcy process than they otherwise would without the availability of a
sale of all assets.24 Debtors value this tool because it allows them to dispose of their assets without having to go through a formal liquidation
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code during which the debtor loses
control of the sale process.25 This can be particularly useful when a
debtor has no intention to emerge from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and
continue operating in a substantially similar way as it did prior to bankruptcy, like in Weinstein Co. Creditors sometimes prefer a sale because they
can either gain control of the assets of the company or be paid out of the
proceeds of the sale.26 In sum, the ability to sell substantially all assets is
(f) The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) and (c) of this
section free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other
than the estate, only if(1) applicable non-bankruptcy law permits sale of such property free
and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to
be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest in in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.
Id. Permitting sales to be free and clear of interests, allows the estate to extract
more value out of property sales than it otherwise would. Mark G. Douglas, Assets
May Be Sold in Bankruptcy Free and Clear of Successor Liability, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS
(Aug. 2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/08/assets-may-be-soldin-bankruptcy-free-and-clear-of-successor-liability [https://perma.cc/L6DW-9HJS].
Instead of litigating a dispute over property prior to any sale, the property can be
sold and the “competing interests . . . can later be resolved in a centralized forum.”
Id.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
23. See Robert G. Sable, Michael J. Roeschenthaler & Daniel F. Blanks, When
the 363 Sale Is the Best Route, 15 J. BANKR. L. AND PRAC. 121, 121–22 (2006) (providing an in-depth analysis of all aspects of a sale of assets under § 363).
24. See CFI Team, 363 Sale, CORP. FIN. INST. https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/deals/363-sale/ [https://perma.cc/VN78-VYDA]
(last updated Oct. 29, 2019) (explaining that a sale under § 363 (1) grants debtors
more control over a liquidation than if it occurred under a trustee appointed by
the court and (2) allows the debtor to set a minimum price at which the assets will
be sold through the use of a stalking horse bidder who has committed to purchasing the assets at that minimum price).
25. See id.
26. See id. The Bankruptcy Code allows creditors to use their lien on a piece
of property to bid for that property, a process known as “credit bidding.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(k). For example, if a creditor has a mortgage for $10 million on a factory
and the debtor tries to sell that factory, the creditor may “credit bid” at the sale for
$10 million. If the creditor wants to bid $12 million, it can use a combination of its

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [], Art. 5

806

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67: p. 801

an invaluable tool for debtors to gain the flexibility needed to navigate
bankruptcy effectively.27
3.

Executory Contracts

The “matrix” of issues presented in entertainment bankruptcies is
capped off by the ongoing debate surrounding executory contracts, which
can have particularly important implications in bankruptcy disputes.28
The determination of whether a contract is executory or non-executory is
the primary issue in this case.29 Although this is such a consequential issue in many bankruptcies, the Bankruptcy Code provides no definition of
what an executory contract is; § 365 directs debtors to “assume or reject
executory contracts” but otherwise provides little guidance to debtors.30
Most courts use the Countryman approach, but some have adopted another method called the functional approach.31
$10 million mortgage to credit bid and $2 million cash. Alternatively, if the creditor has no interest in owning the asset, it is entitled to adequate protection of its
interest. Id. § 363(e). Typically, this will come in the form of a replacement lien
on the proceeds from the sale. Id. § 361.
27. See generally Sable, Roeschenthaler & Blanks, supra note 23.
28. See John A.E. Pottow, A New Approach to Executory Contracts, 96 TEX. L. REV.
1437, 1438–39 (2018) (explaining that the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission on the Reform of Chapter 11 codified Vern Countryman’s approach to
executory contracts). However, the commission relied on “well[-]developed case
law” to explain executory contracts despite the lack of helpful precedent in bankruptcy cases. Id. at 1439 (quoting AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, 112 (2014)). The author compares Westbrook and
White’s approach which abolishes “executoriness” and suggests a novel approach
that does not require the abolition of “executoriness.” Id.
29. See In re Weinstein Company Holdings LLC, 997 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir.
2021) (“The Chapter 11 bankruptcy process gives a debtor many means to rehabilitate its business, including several to manage contractual obligations. Chief
amongst them is the flexibility to assume (i.e., continue) or reject (i.e., breach)
executory contracts . . . . This case is about whether a work-made-for-hire contract
between a producer and a bankrupt movie company is an executory contract.”); see
also In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 261 B.R. 103, 114 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (finding that the ability for a debtor to assume or reject an executory contract is so
fundamental that it cannot be waived by an agreement made by the parties before
the debtor filed a petition for bankruptcy).
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 365; see also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.02[2][a]
(16th ed. 2020) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY] (“Section 365 does not define the term ‘executory contract.’ ”); What Is an Executory Contract in Bankruptcy?,
BEATY HATCH PC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.beatyhatch.com/blog/2018/october/what-is-an-executory-contract-in-bankruptcy-/ [https://perma.cc/MD4URV4H] (“Unfortunately, the bankruptcy code does not define the term ‘executory
contract.’ ”). When a debtor assumes an executory contract, it agrees to cure any
pre-petition default and provide “adequate assurance of future performance” of
the contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(C). Alternatively, when a debtor rejects an
executory contract, the debtor breaches that contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). The
breach is said to have occurred immediately before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1).
31. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 365.02[2][a] (recognizing
that while most courts use the Countryman definition of identifying executory con-
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According to Vern Countryman, an executory contract for the purpose of bankruptcy is “a contract under which the obligation of both the
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that
the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material
breach excusing the performance of the other.”32 The mutuality of obligation means that an executory contract is a mix of assets and liabilities for
the debtor.33 Because of this, the debtor must be allowed to use its business judgment to determine whether the value of the contract outweighs
the costs that will have to be outlaid to realize that value.34
A contract that contains material obligations for only one of the parties should be viewed purely as an asset of or claim against the estate, not a
mix of the two that must be weighed.35 If there is no material performance remaining for the debtor, then there would be no sense in allowing it
to choose whether to assume or reject because the debtor is entitled to
performance by the other party and can bring a traditional contract claim
to enforce that right.36 If the debtor has not materially performed and
the non-debtor has, then it should similarly not be allowed to choose to
assume or reject the contract because the debtor has received all the benefits of the contract and, therefore, can weigh what is best for the estate
from a purely financial perspective—pay the claim of the non-debtor in
pro rata bankruptcy dollars.37 The determination of whether a remaining
obligation under a contract is material is determined by the relevant nontracts, several courts have “employed a result-oriented approach that focuses on
whether the estate will benefit from the assumption or rejection of the contract
rather than looking at mutuality of commitments”).
32. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973). This executory contract definition is unique to bankruptcy
because, as Countryman notes, “[a]ll contracts to a greater or less extent are executory. When they cease to be so, they cease to be contracts.” Id. at 450 (quoting
SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 14 (3d ed.
1957)). In addition to being adopted by most courts, this view of executory contracts seems to be supported by the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. See
In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 50 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[The definition of
executory contract] ‘generally includes contracts on which performance remains
due to some extent on both sides.’ ” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 6303)).
33. See Countryman, supra note 32, at 461.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 450–51.
36. See id. at 459. Additionally, a rejection would purely be a loss to the
debtor and not confer any harm upon the non-debtor party to that contract. Id.
There would consequently be no claim against the debtor because the debt held
by the creditor is zero. Id. at 458–59.
37. See id. at 452–54. To assume a contract already performed by the nondebtor party would require the debtor to pay 100% of the claim held by creditor to
receive the same benefits that it would receive by paying some amount less than
100% of the claim. Id. This would be a waste of estate property, so it should not
be allowed. Id.; see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 365.02.
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bankruptcy law that governs the contract.38 This is the most common test
used to determine whether a contract is executory, and thus able to be
assumed or rejected; this test has been accepted not only by courts and
academics, but also the American Bankruptcy Institute per its 2014 Commission Recommendation Report.39
Alternatively, some courts have adopted what is known as the “functional approach.”40 There are four points to this approach. First, a
debtor must determine whether the contract at issue meets the common
law definition of an executory contract.41 Next, if the only remaining obligations under the contract are on the part of the debtor, then the creditor
holds a “mere claim” that can be enforced under § 502, not § 365.42 If,
however, there are still obligations held by a party other than the debtor,
the trustee needs to determine whether assumption, resulting in full payment of any obligations and the realization of any benefits, outweighs the
value of any claim that will be brought by the creditor.43 Finally, the trus38. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); see also In re Exide
Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 962 (3d Cir. 2010).
39. AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11:
2012–2014 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 112 (2014) (recommending that
the Code explicitly adopt the Countryman definition of executory contract by making it a defined term).
40. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 365.02[2][a].
41. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Kelsi Stayart White, The Demystification of
Contracts in Bankruptcy, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 481, 489 (2017). In full, Westbrook and
White describe their approach as:
1. Under state contract law, determine if the contract contains some obligations that remain to be performed and therefore is executory under
the common law definition. If not, it is not a contract at all, just a bit of
historical residue.
2. If there is nothing remaining under the contract except obligations owed by the debtor, almost always this is what we think of as a “mere
claim” against the estate—that is, the only performance obligation left is
the estate’s payment of money in Bankruptcy Dollars (BD$), typically
worth a fraction of full U.S. dollars. These “mere claims” do not require
treatment under section 365 because there is nothing left to do except
payment and discharge through the bankruptcy process, so here section
502 is the relevant provision.
3. If some obligations remain other than those described in number
two, will the net benefit to the estate from the performance by both parties (assumption) exceed the net benefit from the estate’s breach of the
contract and payment of the breach (rejection) claim in fractional
amounts (BD$)?
4. The trustee should choose and the court should approve the
course of action producing net benefit to the estate, unless some other
specific provision in section 365 requires a different conclusion.
Id. at 489–90 (footnotes omitted).
42. Id.; see also id. at App. 546–47 (citing In re Exide Techs., 378 B.R. at 762) (“A
‘mere claim’ is when the debtor owes money to another party but there [are] no
other obligations that must be fulfilled by either party. It is what the legislative
history refers to when it says that executory contracts should not include accounts
receivable or notes.”).
43. See id. at 489.
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tee should follow whatever the analysis says—if assumption brings a
greater net benefit to the estate than rejection, then the contract should
be assumed.44 This approach might seem similar to the Countryman definition in both form and function, but the key distinction is that the Countryman definition focuses first on form and the functional approach relies
primarily on the ultimate benefit to the estate without a requirement that
strict steps need to be taken to ensure there is material performance remaining on both sides of the contract.45
B.

Material Breach and Substantial Performance Considerations Under
New York Contract Law

According to the Butner principle, state law creates substantive rights
in a bankruptcy proceeding.46 One key consideration under the Countryman definition of executory contracts is whether a breach is considered
material, thus relieving the non-breaching party from its obligations.47
The combination of these two statements necessitates a brief examination
of the idea of material breach under New York contract law.48
New York follows the contract principle of substantial performance.49
In the seminal case of Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,50 then-Judge Benjamin
Cardozo stated that, “an omission, both trivial and innocent, will sometimes be atoned for by allowance of the resulting damage, and will not
always be the breach of a condition to be followed by a forfeiture.”51 Even
though this case is now over one hundred years old, it is still “the standard
44. Id.
45. Id. at 482. One perennial issue, although not at the core of the issues
discussed in this Casebrief, is what to do with contracts that have not been either
assumed or rejected, regardless of whether a court uses the Countryman or functional approach. See Westbrook & White, supra note 41, at 518 n.184; see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 365.03[6]. Due to the “permissive” language
regarding the debtor’s ability to assume or reject executory contracts and the requirement that the court approve the debtor’s action, it is possible for an executory contract to be neither assumed nor rejected for the entire bankruptcy
proceeding, including through confirmation. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 30, ¶ 365.03[6]. In that case, the contract simply “rides through” the bankruptcy; it exists on the other side. Id. Because the approach put forth by Westbrook and White and this Casebrief is more permissive than the Countryman
definition, it is reasonable to think that this might be a more pervasive problem
that needs to be addressed. Westbrook and White posit that this issue is resolved
by broad language in confirmation plans that either assume all contracts not rejected or reject all contracts not assumed. See Westbrook & White, supra note 41, at
517–18. The prevalence and effectiveness of this solution is unknown, but it warrants further research.
46. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are
created and defined by state law.”).
47. See Countryman, supra note 32, at 453.
48. The contract at the heart of the dispute in Weinstein Co. is governed by
New York law. See infra Part IV.
49. See HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11.3 (2022).
50. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
51. See id. at 890.
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both for the analysis of the respective rights of parties when there is a
breach and for the determination of whether there has been substantial
compliance with the contract.”52
IV. THE PRINCIPAL CASE—IN

RE

WEINSTEIN COMPANY HOLDINGS LLC

In 2011, Bruce Cohen and his production company entered into a
contract (the Cohen Agreement) with SLP Films, Inc. to produce the film
Silver Linings Playbook (the Picture).53 The contract was structured as a
“work-made-for-hire” contract, so Cohen did not own any of the intellectual property in the Picture.54 Cohen was paid $250,000 in fixed initial
compensation as well as contingent future compensation equal to about
5% of the Picture’s net profits.55
After the Picture was released and following a series of intra-entity
transfers, TWC purported to own all the rights pertaining to the Picture,
including the Cohen Agreement.56
In 2017, following sexual misconduct allegations against Harvey Weinstein, TWC attempted to sell its business and found Spyglass as the only
interested buyer.57 As a result, TWC filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in
March 2018, which required the bankruptcy court to approve the sale to
Spyglass under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.58 Following the Bankruptcy Court’s approval, Spyglass purchased TWC under an asset purchase
agreement which closed in July 2018.59 The purchase agreement gave
Spyglass until November 2018 to designate which executory contracts it
wanted to assume from TWC as part of the sale.60
In October 2018, Spyglass filed a declaratory judgment action against
Cohen seeking a determination that the Cohen Agreement “is not execu52. See HUNTER, supra note 49.
53. See In re Weinstein Company Holdings LLC, 997 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir.
2021).
54. Id. at 501.
55. Id. at 502. The contingent compensation provision of the Cohen Agreement provided that if “[Cohen] fully perform[s] all required services and obligations hereunder and in relation to the Picture, and [is] not otherwise in breach or
default hereof, [Cohen] shall be entitled to receive [Contingent Compensation].”
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Appendix 2329, Cohen Agreement ¶ 3, Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d 497 (Nos. 20-1750 and 20-1751)).
56. Id. at 502 n.2 (explaining that SLP Films transferred its rights in the Picture to SLPTWC Films, LLC, another special purpose entity, which subsequently
dissolved in October 2013, leaving TWC, as the sole member of SLPTWC, all the
rights of the picture, including the Cohen Agreement).
57. Id. at 502.
58. Id. (explaining that the District of Delaware bankruptcy court was required to approve the sale of TWC under the bankruptcy code).
59. Id. (explaining that the bankruptcy court approved the sale to Spyglass
subject to an asset purchase agreement between the parties).
60. Id. (demonstrating that TWC had a number of executory contracts and
Spyglass was given an option of which it would assume under the asset purchase
agreement).
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tory and therefore was already [sold] to [Spyglass] pursuant to Bankruptcy
Code section 363.”61 Shortly after, other writers, producers, and actors
with similar works-made-for-hire contracts (the Talent Party Agreements)
argued that their contracts were also executory, resulting in Spyglass’s legal responsibility for millions of dollars in contingent compensation.62
In January 2019, the Bankruptcy Court issued a bench ruling granting
Spyglass’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the Cohen
Agreement was not an executory contract and thus could be sold under
§ 363.63 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision and
Cohen timely appealed to the Third Circuit.64
V.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

The Third Circuit began its analysis by emphasizing the importance
of this case, stating, “[a]t stake is whether Spyglass must cure existing defaults and pay around $400,000 owed to Cohen before the sale’s closing.”65 The Third Circuit analyzed Cohen’s claim under § 365(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.66 The Supreme Court previously explained that Congress intended the term “executory” to mean “a contract ‘on which performance is due to some extent on both sides.’”67
However, believing this definition to be too broad, the Third Circuit
has taken a narrower view of the term.68 The Third Circuit summarized
their test for executory contracts to be, “under the relevant state law governing the contract, each side has at least one material unperformed obligation as of the bankruptcy petition date.”69
61. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Appendix 1152, Weinstein Co., 997
F.3d 497 (Nos. 20-1750 and 20-1751)) (demonstrating the initial disagreement
over the status of the Cohen agreement as executory or not).
62. Id. at 503.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 501. The court furthered that Spyglass’s motivations for buying
the Cohen Agreement were irrelevant for the legal question at issue, but noted
that Spyglass claimed it wanted to purchase the Cohen Agreement as “evidence of
[the transfer of intellectual property] and the rights that came with it.” Id. at 503
n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting Oral Argument Transcript at 29:6–10, Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d 497 (Nos. 20-1750 and 20-1751)). The court emphasized its
skepticism that this was the only reason behind the purchase and explained that
Cohen could not interfere with the Picture’s intellectual property even if TWC
breached the Cohen Agreement. Id.
66. See id. at 504.
67. See id. (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6
(1984)).
68. See id. (citing In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 50 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir.
1995)).
69. See id. The Third Circuit adopted the executory contract definition offered by Vern Countryman, which stated, “[An executory contract is] a contract
under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance
would constitute a material breach excusing performance of the other.” See Coun-
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The Third Circuit emphasized the practicality of this test by explaining that this framework “attempts to foolproof the debtor’s choice to assume or reject contracts.”70 Under § 363, if the buyer wants to buy an
executory contract, the debtor must assume and then assign that contract
to the buyer.71 Importantly, to assume a contract, the debtor or the buyer
must cure all existing defaults or provide adequate assurance of a cure.72
The Third Circuit views this approach as a “fairness” exercise and explained that it allows the debtor to continue doing business despite its
bankrupt status.73
Alternatively, if the contract is not executory, it can be sold to a buyer
under § 363 like any other liability or asset.74 The court explains that in a
case like this, where only the debtor has material obligations left to perform, the contract is a liability on the estate that the buyer voluntarily
tryman, supra note 32, at 460; see also In re Gen. DataComm Indus., Inc., 407 F.3d
616, 623 (3d Cir. 2005); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30, ¶ 365.02[2](a)
n.10. “Thus,” the Third Circuit explained, “unless both parties have unperformed
obligations that would constitute a material breach if not performed, the contract
is not executory . . . .” Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 503 (quoting Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d
at 239). Further, the Third Circuit in Columbia Gas importantly noted that the test
of unperformed obligations should be conducted at the time of the bankruptcy
petition and is governed by state law. See Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 239–40 n.10.
70. See Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 504. The Columbia Gas court provided a helpful example, explaining that executory contracts are essentially “a combination of
assets and liabilities to the bankruptcy estate; the performance the nonbankrupt
owes the debtor constitutes an asset, and the performance the debtor owes the
nonbankrupt is a liability.” Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 238 (citing THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 106–07 (1986). Under this approach, treating a contract as executory where one of the parties has fully
performed but the other has not risked either “inadvertent rejection” or “inadvertent assumption” which would result in a remaining obligation of the debtor to
pay. See Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 504 (citing COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note
30, ¶ 365.02[2](a)).
71. See Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 505 (citing In re CellNet Data Sys., Inc., 327
F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 47
(Bankr. D. Del. 1999)).
72. See Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 505 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(b); Columbia Gas,
50 F.3d at 238). The contract essentially needs to be put in “the same place as if
the bankruptcy did not happen” in order to be assumed. See id. The Bankruptcy
Code “mandates that the debtor accept the liability with the asset and fully perform his end of the bargain,” for an assumed executory contract. Id. (quoting
Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 238). If the executory contract is instead rejected, the
non-breaching party would be relegated to an unsecured creditor. Id. at 505 n.7
(citing CellNet Data Sys., Inc., 327 F.3d at 249).
73. See id. at 505 (citing In re Penn Traffic Co., 524 F.3d 373, 382 (2d Cir.
2008)) (explaining that by assuming the contract, the debtor can essentially force
others to continue doing business with them despite the other parties being reluctant due to their bankrupt status).
74. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text; see also Weinstein Co., 997
F.3d at 505 (citing In re Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 402 B.R. 87, 94 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2009)) (explaining that § 363 “permits a debtor to transfer its rights and
obligations under a non-executory contract”).
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assumes.75 However, without an agreement otherwise, neither party is required to cure existing defaults on these liabilities.76
As noted above, if the Cohen Agreement is an executory contract and
therefore assumed and assigned under § 365, Spyglass would be responsible for approximately $400,000 in previously unpaid contingent compensation.77 If Spyglass instead purchased the Cohen Agreement as a nonexecutory contract under § 363, Spyglass would be responsible only for
obligations on a go-forward basis after the sale closed.78
The Third Circuit determined that New York law governs the Cohen
agreement and noted that, “[i]n New York, ‘[a] material breach is a failure to do something that is so fundamental to a contract that the failure to
perform that obligation defeats the essential purpose of the contract.’”79
Further, New York follows the substantial performance doctrine.80
Applying the above standard, the court concluded that the obligation
to pay contingent compensation to Cohen was “clearly material.”81 Therefore, TWC had at least one material obligation left to perform under the
Cohen Agreement.82 Next, the court addressed whether Cohen had any
75. See Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 505 n.8 (explaining that the issue of assuming liabilities, although seemingly unfavorable, is often negotiated between the
debtor and buyer for a discount on the purchase price). The negotiated purchase
eliminates the fairness concerns for the bankrupt counterparty. See id. at 506.
76. See id. at 505–06 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(f); In re Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003)) (noting that successor liability is often “extinguished” in a § 363 sale). Typically, a buyer must fulfill obligations under the
contract it bought after the sale closes, but since the nonbankrupt counterparty is
already in “at least as good a position as without the sale,” no cure is necessary. Id.
The Court further explains that the nonbankrupt would only expect to recover
cents on the dollar if no buyer came forward, so they “should simply be grateful
that someone agreed to buy its contract and assume obligations after the sale’s
closing.” Id. at 506.
77. See id. at 506.
78. See id.
79. See id. (alterations in original) (quoting Feldmann v. Scepter Grp., Pte.
Ltd., 185 A.D.3d 449, 450 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)). The central question before the
court was whether the Cohen Agreement contained “at least one obligation for
both [TWC] and [Cohen] that would constitute a material breach under New York
law if not performed.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting In re Exide Techs.,
607 F.3d 957, 962 (3d Cir. 2010)).
80. See id. (defining substantial performance as “[i]f the party in default has
substantially performed, the other party’s performance is not excused.” (quoting
Hadden v. Consol. Edison Co., 312 N.E.2d 445, 449 (1974))). However, the court
notes that substantial performance and material breach are “two sides of the same
coin” because if a breach is material, “it follows that substantial performance has
not been rendered.” Id. (quoting In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 751 F.3d 955, 962
(8th Cir. 2014)).
81. See id. (explaining that the amount of contingent compensation “far exceeded that of fixed compensation,” and therefore was the “primary consideration” under the agreement (citing Awards.com, LLC v. Kinko’s, Inc., 834 N.Y.S.2d
147, 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007))). The Awards.com court specified that failure to
pay the “primary consideration” is a material breach. Id.
82. See id. at 506–07.
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remaining obligations.83 The court explained that his remaining obligations were immaterial because he completed his work on the Picture,
which was released six years prior, and he performed no further work postrelease.84 The remaining obligations were each ancillary and did not go
to the “root of the contract” or “defeat the purpose of the entire transaction” if breached.85
Finally, Cohen argued that the court should not substitute its holding
for obligations that the parties have already agreed were material.86 While
the court agreed with Cohen that parties can contract around the substantial performance rule, they rejected his overall argument because “the parties did not clearly and unambiguously avoid the substantial performance
rule.”87 Unlike previously upheld materiality provisions, the Cohen
Agreement was not dealing with a remedies or termination section of the
83. See id. at 507 (noting that the “essence of the Cohen Agreement” was the
production of the Picture for compensation).
84. See id. at 507 (citing In re Qintex Ent., Inc., 950 F.2d 1492, 1497 (9th Cir.
1991); In re Stein & Day Inc., 81 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)) (noting that
most courts agree that work-made-for-hire contracts usually do not have material
obligations after the work is completed, even if there are ancillary negative covenants or indemnification obligations in the contract).
85. See id. (quoting In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 962–63 (3d Cir. 2010)).
The court addressed each obligation as follows:
Cohen agreed to refrain from seeking injunctive relief about the exploitation of the Picture. But that covenant is redundant, for Cohen has no
claim to the Picture’s intellectual property rights and is already obligated
to respect that property under relevant law. Also immaterial is Cohen’s
obligation to indemnify TWC against third-party claims arising from the
breach of his representations, warranties or covenants, as the statute of
limitations has likely expired on most, if not all, of the potential claims.
Finally, the restrictions on Cohen’s ability to assign the contract are ancillary boilerplate provisions. For instance, the Agreement requires Cohen
to comply with a set of procedures to give TWC the right of first refusal if
Cohen tries to sell or assign his right to receive contingent compensation.
This obligation, however, is not a “significant undertaking,” as Cohen
“has no obligation to [TWC] if he wants to accept more favorable terms
from [others].”
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Stein & Day, 81 B.R. at
267).
86. See id. The Cohen Agreement provided that TWC must pay contingent
compensation provided Cohen is “not otherwise in breach or default.” Id. (quoting Appendix 2329, Cohen Agreement ¶ 3, Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d 497 (Nos. 201750 and 20-1751)).
87. Id. at 508. See also Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2049 (2012) (explaining that parties can avoid the
default substantial performance rule by “apt and certain words”). The court further acknowledged its decision in In re General DataComm Industries, Inc. that held,
“where the contract makes plain that certain unperformed obligations are material, we can conclude the contract is executory without further analysis.” Id. at 508
(citing In re Gen. DataComm Indus., Inc., 407 F.3d 616, 623–24 (3d Cir. 2005)).
The court conceded that a breach can be considered material if “upon a reasonable interpretation of the contract, the parties considered the breach as vital to the
existence of the contract.” Id. (quoting RICHARD A. LORD, 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:3 (4th ed. 2018)).
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contract.88 The court also clarified that the Cohen Agreement includes a
condition precedent to TWC’s payment obligation rather than a breach or
default.89
VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The need for a uniform standard of analysis for executory contracts is
evident in this case. One commentator refers to the Countryman test as “a
tempest in a teapot,” and notes the “muddied analysis and conflicting case
law” surrounding executory determinations is often irrelevant.90 This debate creates a theoretical exercise with not many practical differences.
Another pair of commentators take a harsher approach, theorizing
that the Countryman test was due for a “well-deserved demise.”91 The authors discuss the evolution of the definition of “executory” over the years
and the “executoriness” effects of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.92 Similarly,
88. Compare Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 507–08, with Gen. DataComm, 407 F.3d at
623–24, and In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264, 278 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2013) (explaining the court’s views this case which deals with a “covenant” and the
one’s cited by Cohen which deal with “termination provision[s]” as distinct), and
Avant Guard Props., LLC v. NYC Indus. Dev., No. 115209/10, 2015 WL 7070066, at
*5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 2015) (explaining that this case turned on the contract’s
termination provision which “made it clear . . . that only complete performance
will satisfy the agreement”). The court emphasized that there is a clear distinction
between covenant and termination provisions because “[w]hen parties say that
breach of a provision would result in termination or rescission of the contract, they
make clear that the provision is material.” Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 508 (citing
LORD, supra note 87, § 63:3). Covenants, on the other hand, address the parties’
obligations and “typically are not a natural place to look when determining which
of those obligations the parties consider to be material.” Id.
89. See Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 507–08 (emphasizing the word “if” beginning
the relevant provision and defining a condition precedent as “an event whose occurrence triggers an obligation” (citing Pac. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Glob. Reinsurance
Corp. of Am., 693 F.3d 417, 430 (3d Cir. 2012))). The court elaborated on this
distinction further, stating, “[I]f the remaining obligations in the contract are
mere conditions, not duties, then the contract cannot be executory for purposes of
§ 365.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 50 F.3d
233, 241 (3d Cir. 1995)).
90. See Moore, supra note 7, at 587–88 (explaining the consequences if the
contract is non-executory). The author explains that finding that a contract is
non-executory may entitle the other party to specific performance and its damages
may be entitled to administrative priority status. Id. However, if there are no remaining obligations for the debtor, the contract will likely be considered executory
under either the Countryman or functional test. Id.
91. See Westbrook & White, supra note 41, at 481–82 (noting that the Countryman test has become a “monster that its creator . . . would not recognize”). The
authors explain that that this outdated test is “troublesome” when applied to modern contracts, specifically citing options contracts, intellectual property licenses,
and LLC operating agreements, all of which are central issues to many entertainment contracts and bankruptcy disputes. Id. at 482.
92. See id. at 493–94 (explaining that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code required
court approval to assume or reject contracts). The authors note that this change
“obviated the most important benefit of the executoriness test.” Id. at 493. Despite the Code removing “provability” from executory contract analysis, courts con-
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these authors note there is ample case law claiming that non-executory
contracts cannot be rejected as well as the opposite conclusion, that they
cannot be assumed.93 However, these authors make an important distinction, noting that although it appears executoriness is irrelevant when only
the debtor has a remaining duty, assumption should at least be considered
and “mere claims” should be analyzed under § 502.94
Ultimately, while the Countryman material breach test is wellequipped to resolve simple contract disputes in bankruptcy contexts, it
may not provide the best solution to more nuanced contracts, which are
becoming more and more common in the entertainment industry. This
case provides a perfect example of a complex contract that exposes the
Countryman test’s limitations.
The Third Circuit ought to have adopted the functional approach as
described by Westbrook and White above. Despite some reservations,95
this approach would have provided greater flexibility in this case, allowing
for a full cost-benefit analysis instead of merely declaring the contract is
not executory because “material performance” is not present on both
sides.96
tinued to “expand the application of the material breach test to more and more
kinds of contracts.” Id. at 494.
93. See id. at 498 (“Some courts have held that contracts that are ‘non-executory’ simply ‘ride-through.’ As one court put it, they ‘survive the bankruptcy case
unaffected.’ ” (quoting In re Access Beyond Technologies, Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 41
(Bankr. D. Del. 1999))).
94. See id. at 489 n.44 (suggesting that “mere claims” should be treated under
§ 502 rather than § 365 because they are non-executory). Under the Westbrook
and White approach, “the executive’s right to money is the equivalent of an account receivable,” not an executory contract, resulting in treatment under § 502
rather than § 365. Id. at 489 n.4, app. 545–46 (describing the solution to In re
Exide Techs., 378 B.R. 762 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) under Westbrook and White’s
approach). The authors do concede that it is still plausible to analyze debtor-only
or mere claims as executory contracts, but they state that they should almost always
be rejected. Id. at 489 n.44. An issue arises, however, if the trustee assumes a
debtor-only contract and benefits from being paid administrative expenses. Id.
The authors explain the consequences of analyzing a contract under § 502 compared to § 365 but note that this approach causes worry among lawyers for inadvertent assumptions. Id. The authors further note that executoriness is irrelevant to a
contract where only the debtor has a remaining duty, but assumption should “at
least be considered” for any remaining “mere claims.” Id. at 511.
95. See Westbrook & White, supra note 41, at 518 n.184 (admitting that there
is well-founded concern for the authors’ approach based on contracts being potentially overlooked).
96. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (detailing the steps a court
should consider and emphasizing the importance of leaving the “net benefit” analysis to the parties); see also Westbrook & White, supra note 41, at 520 n.192 (explaining that the Countryman definition requires the court to involve itself in
“unnecessary legal quandaries” (quoting In re Seymour, 144 B.R. 524, 529 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1992); In re Weinstein Company Holdings LLC, 997 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir.
2021)). Westbrook and White specifically provide an analogy to a hospital being
run “for the benefit of the staff, not the patients,” to emphasize that the concerns
of overlooking contracts are outweighed by the potential uniformity of the system.
Westbrook & White, supra note 41, at 518 n.184. The analogy demonstrates that
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The first step of the functional approach analysis is to determine
whether there are “some obligations that remain to be performed” to determine whether the contract is executory under common law.97 The
court in this case recognized that both TWC and Cohen had remaining
obligations.98 However, because Cohen’s obligations were deemed “immaterial,” the court summarily decided that the contract is not executory.99 Under the Westbrook and White definition, though, these
contracts are executory under common law.100 The next step is simple
and already answered by the brief analysis in this paragraph; a court must
review the Cohen agreement to make sure there is at least some obligation
on both sides so that the unperformed obligations of the debtor are not
just a “mere claim” against the estate held by Cohen.101 Although Cohen’s remaining contract obligations are not as weighty as TWC’s remaining obligations, this part of the test is satisfied because there is some
obligation.102
The third and fourth steps of this analysis are also relatively straightforward if the actions of the debtor are to be viewed as acting rationally.103
The debtor wanted to maximize the value of the contract for the estate,
but that simple calculation is clouded because the debtor and the buyer of
although the test proposed may not be perfect and some contracts may be overlooked, the increase in “litigation and business planning” required to address every
contract under the old test would be detrimental to the clients. Id.
97. See Westbrook & White, supra note 41, at 489.
98. See Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 506–07.
99. Id. at 507 (“A closer look at Cohen’s remaining obligations confirms our suspicions—they are all ancillary after-thoughts in a production agreement. . . . Also
immaterial is Cohen’s obligation to indemnify TWC against third-party claims . . . .
This obligation, however, is not a ‘significant undertaking’ . . . .” (emphasis added)
(citations omitted)).
100. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining the Westbrook and
White test).
101. See Westbrook & White, supra note 41, at 489 (explaining that if just a
“mere claim” remains, the contract does not need to be treated under § 365 because “there is nothing left to do except payment and discharge through the bankruptcy process . . . .”). If there is simply a mere claim remaining, then § 502 is the
correct provision under the Westbrook and White approach, and no further analysis is needed. Id.
102. See id. (noting that although there could be a debate about whether only
a mere claim exists, it is more likely that the Westbrook and White steps two and
three conclude there is at least “some obligation” remaining). In fact, the Weinstein Co. court agrees, holding that TWC had material obligation remaining, while
Cohen’s remaining obligations were immaterial. Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 507; see
also supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s reasoning
behind these holdings).
103. See Westbrook & White, supra note 41, at 489 (explaining that since an
obligation remains other than a mere claim, the Westbrook and White test then
asks, “will the net benefit to the estate from the performance by both parties (assumption) exceed the net benefit from the estate’s breach of the contract and
payment of the breach (rejection) claim in fractional amounts (BD$)?”).
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the contract did not believe it to be executory at all.104 Therefore, the
buyer did not consider that it would have to pay the $400,000 owed under
the contract on pre-petition defaults.105 It is reasonable to believe that an
additional $400,000 liability on this contract would not have been too
large an impediment to stop the transaction due to the sheer size of the
transaction.106 Therefore, the contract is executory under the common
law definition because there are remaining obligations, those obligations
are mutual, and assumption would benefit the estate.107
VII. IMPACT
This alternative analysis would have an immediate effect on this case
and the litigants therein, but it also has a wide-ranging impact on how all
contracts in bankruptcy are viewed. The most poignant effect is that Cohen would be entitled to full payment of his $400,000 claim instead of
being paid on a pro rata basis as an unsecured claimant.108 Further, all of
the other work-made-for-hire contracts in this case would be fully paid on
any missed payments as well.109
Looking beyond this particular case, if the Westbrook and White test
was adopted, creditors and debtors would have more opportunities to analyze contracts and more flexibility to reject those contracts if they are not
beneficial to the estate, even if the obligations are not “material.” If the
court had analyzed the case by applying Westbrook and White’s analysis
rather than Countryman’s, the debtor would not be forced to choose between assuming or rejecting the contract, regardless of how “foolproof”
the court imagines the decision to be.110
While adopting Westbrook and White’s approach could ease some of
the tension in determining whether a contract is executory or not, it
104. See Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 502 (emphasizing the importance of determining if the contract was executory). Under step four of the Westbrook and
White test, the trustee must choose a course of action that provides net benefit to
the estate, but this decision is complicated when the parties are unsure or in disagreement about when a contract is executory. See Westbrook & White, supra note
41, at 498–99.
105. See Weinstein Co., 997 F.3d at 502 (explaining that the disagreement
about the determination if the contract is executory or not is crucial to the parties’
decision making process).
106. See Order Approving Amendment to Asset Purchase Agreement at Exhibit 1 at 2, In re Weinstein Company Holdings, LLC, Case No. 18-10601 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2018) (amending the purchase price to be paid by Lantern Entertainment,
LLC from $310 million to $289 million). The size of this transaction and the
amended price suggests that the parties are willing to negotiate on price given
changing litigation and business conditions.
107. See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text (providing the framework
for the Westbrook and White analysis of the Cohen Agreement).
108. See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 65 and 81–89 and accompanying text.
110. See In re Weinstein Company Holdings LLC, 997 F.3d 497, 504 (3d Cir.
2021).
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would require a bit of statutory maneuvering. Additionally, there may still
be lingering issues within the Westbrook and White approach, such as how
the code treats non-executory contracts.111 While it may be difficult to
break away from decades of “well[-]developed case law,” and not a perfect
solution, adopting a uniform approach to executory contract analysis can
alleviate some of the more confusing portions of entertainment
bankruptcies.112
111. See Pottow, supra note 28, at 1440 (explaining that the executoriness debate seeks to eliminate the grey area when disagreements arise about whether a
contract is executory or not). Pottow, however, is skeptical that this resolves all
issues, explaining that when a contract is deemed non-executory under either the
Countryman or Westbrook and White approach, the litigation simply ends “without any rigorous working-through of the consequences.” Id.
112. See id. at 1448–49 (explaining that Westbrook and White sought to essentially eliminate the executoriness part of the equation and focus on § 365(a)). Despite the ABI Commission Expert Group’s belief that “well[-]developed case law on
executoriness” outweighed the points made by Westbrook and White, the test has
failed to provide the “guidance” to parties and courts that was expected. Id.
Therefore, a uniform approach will alleviate tension and make this process easier
for courts as well as parties struggling with disagreements about executory
contracts.
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